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United States v. Wise: Is Failure to Stop for the Police
a Sentence-Enhancing Crime of Violence?
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Wise,1 the Tenth Circuit held that a felony
conviction under Utah’s so-called “failure-to-stop”2 (for the police)
statute could be a “crime of violence.”3 In 2007, Michael Charles
Wise pleaded guilty to felony possession of a firearm;4 the issue for
the Tenth Circuit was whether his 2006 failure-to-stop conviction
would qualify as a sentence enhancing “crime of violence” under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”).5 The Tenth Circuit
examined the statutory definition for “crime of violence,” as well as
the comparable term “violent felony,”6 to determine whether Wise’s
failure-to-stop offense presented a “serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.”7 The court held that his conviction qualified as a
“crime of violence,” reading the term broadly and relying on its own
precedent, United States v. West,8 which had already been partially

1. 597 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2010).
2. The Utah offense is actually designated “[f]ailure to respond to officer’s signal to
stop.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-210 (West Supp. 2010). Because the Tenth Circuit refers to
the Utah provision as a “failure-to-stop statute,” Wise, 597 F.3d at 1146, this Note will also
use that phrase to describe the Utah statute and similar statutes from other states that
criminalize the failure to stop when given a signal to do so by the police. Other states call this
type of crime by many different names. See, e.g., United States v. Rivers, 595 F.3d 558, 560
(4th Cir. 2010) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-750(A) (1976)) (referring to South Carolina’s
law as “failure to stop for a blue light”); United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir.
2009) (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.487 (2009)) (referring to Minnesota’s law as “fleeing a
peace officer in a motor vehicle”).
3. Wise, 597 F.3d at 1148.
4. Id. at 1142.
5. Id. at 1144 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)
(2006)).
6. The term “violent felony” is used in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e) (2006), and the wording is functionally equivalent to “crime of violence.” See infra
note 33 and accompanying text.
7. Wise, 597 F.3d at 1143–44 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4B1.2(a)(2) (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
8. 550 F.3d 952 (2008). Interestingly enough, Judge Ebel wrote the Tenth Circuit
opinion for both West and Wise, so it comes as no shock that he enthusiastically defended his
prior opinion in West.
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overruled by the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Chambers v.
United States.9
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions, like Chambers and Begay
v. United States,10 unambiguously indicate an unwillingness to
liberally interpret the statutory language defining “crime of
violence.”11 Even so, since the Court has not been able to articulate a
fully workable test to effectively guide the lower courts,12 the result
has been a circuit split on whether a failure-to-stop conviction should
qualify as a sentence enhancing “crime of violence.”13 The Supreme
Court has recently taken notice, granting certiorari in another case to
review this particular question.14 This Note will argue that while the
9. 129 S. Ct. 687, 693 (2009) (holding that a criminal’s failure to report to a local
prison for weekend incarceration, in violation of state law, was not a “violent felony” under the
Armed Career Criminal Act).
10. 553 U.S. 137, 148 (2008) (holding that a DUI charge was not a “violent felony”
under the Armed Career Criminal Act).
11. Because the terms “crime of violence” and “violent felony” are functionally
interchangeable, for convenience I will predominantly use “crime of violence” to refer to both
terms. See infra note 33.
12. See Hayley A. Montgomery, Comment, Remedying the Armed Career Criminal
Act’s Ailing Residual Provision, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 715, 719 (2010) (describing the
Court’s jurisprudence on the issue as “complicated and opaque”).
13. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Chambers, there are at least
three circuits that have agreed with the Tenth Circuit that failure-to-stop felonies can be
considered “crimes of violence.” See Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 429 (7th Cir.
2010); United States v. Young, 580 F.3d 373, 381 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Harrimon, 568 F.3d 531, 537 (5th Cir. 2009). The Eighth Circuit is itself split on the issue.
Compare United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722, 725 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that fleeing a
peace officer in a vehicle under Minnesota law is not a crime of violence), with United States v.
Hudson, 577 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that resisting arrest by fleeing in a
vehicle under Missouri law is a crime of violence). Besides the Eighth Circuit, at least two
other circuits since 2009 have not allowed failure-to-stop felonies to be considered “crimes of
violence.” See United States v. Rivers, 595 F.3d 558, 560 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1301 (11th Cir. 2009). Since Chambers, at least one circuit has
issued a non-precedential opinion affirming its prior decision not to consider failure-to-stop
felonies as “crimes of violence.” United States v. Peterson, No. 07-30465, 2009 WL 3437834,
at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 2009) (citing United States v. Jennings, 515 F.3d 980, 989–91 (9th
Cir. 2008)) (“Peterson’s conviction . . . for attempting to elude a police officer, is not
categorically a crime of violence . . . .”).
14. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in September 2010 to review a Seventh
Circuit opinion, United States v. Sykes, 598 F.3d 334 (7th Cir. 2010). Sykes v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 63 (2010) (granting certiorari). The Supreme Court will decide the question of
“[w]hether using a vehicle while knowingly or intentionally fleeing from a law enforcement
officer after being ordered to stop constitutes a ‘violent felony’ under the Armed Career
Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).” Question Presented: Sykes v. United States, SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/09-11311qp.pdf (last
visited Feb. 23, 2011).
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core holding of West (and Wise) was not directly overruled by the
Supreme Court in Chambers, a careful analysis of the Court’s often
vague jurisprudence supports the conclusion that a felony conviction
under Utah’s sweeping failure-to-stop statute should not qualify as a
“crime of violence.” In contemplating how the Supreme Court
might deal with this issue, this Note considers a proposal by Judge
Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, as well as the possibility that
the Court might strike the “crime of violence” residual clause on
account of unconstitutional vagueness.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 22, 2007, Michael Charles Wise was “charged in a
one-count indictment with being a previously-convicted felon in
possession of a nine millimeter Smith & Wesson handgun, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).”15 That statute makes it unlawful
for “any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, [sic] a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . .
[from] possess[ing] in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition.”16 Wise ultimately pleaded guilty to the gun possession
a few months after he was charged.17
In its Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the Probation
Office “recommended that Wise be sentenced under USSG
2K2.1(a)(4)(a).”18 Under that section, the offender’s base offense
level19 is raised if “the defendant committed any part of the instant
offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of . . . a crime
of violence.”20 Section 4B1.2 of the USSG defines “crime of
violence” as
15. United States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141, 1142 (10th Cir. 2010).
16. Id. at 1142 n.1 (alterations in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006))
(internal quotations omitted).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1142–43. The United States Sentencing Commission provides judges with
recommended sentences, as found in the USSG, based on the offense level of the instant
offense, and the criminal history of the offender. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission 1–3,
http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview_2
0101122.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2011), [hereinafter Commission Overview].
19. Commission Overview, supra note 18, at 2 (“Based on the severity of the offense, the
guidelines assign most federal crimes to one of 43 ‘offense levels.’ Each offender is also
assigned to one of six ‘criminal history categories’ based upon the extent and recency of his or
her past misconduct.”).
20. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (2006). Since Wise was
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any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year, that . . . (1) has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or
extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.21

The PSR noted that Wise had been previously convicted in 2006
“for failing to stop in response to a police officer’s command to do
so, which under Utah Code § 41-6A-210 is a third-degree felony.”22
This failure-to-stop statute reads as follows:
An operator who receives a visual or audible signal from a peace
officer to bring the vehicle to a stop may not: (i) operate the
vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere
with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person; or (ii)
attempt to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or other means.23

Wise objected to the characterization of his 2006 conviction as a
prior “crime of violence.” The district court disagreed, and Wise
appealed to the Tenth Circuit.24
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
To help understand the import of the Tenth Circuit’s analysis,
this Part will give a brief overview of the legislation that created the
“crime of violence” sentence enhancement, as well as the various
court decisions that have attempted to interpret that legislation.
A. Sentence Enhancements for a “Crime of Violence”
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,25
which created the U.S. Sentencing Commission (“Commission”).
The Commission is “required to prescribe guideline ranges that
specify an appropriate sentence for each class of convicted persons.”26
Although these guidelines are not mandatory, the Supreme Court
convicted under the 2006 version of the USSG, Wise, 597 F.3d at 1143 n.2, this Note will
refer to that version.
21. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2006).
22. Wise, 597 F.3d at 1143.
23. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-210(1)(a) (West Supp. 2010).
24. Wise, 597 F.3d at 1143.
25. Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987.
26. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2006).
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has held that “district courts . . . must consult those Guidelines and
take them into account when sentencing.”27
That same year, Congress also passed the Armed Career Criminal
Act (“ACCA”) of 1984.28 This law provided that “any convicted
felon found guilty of possession of a firearm, who had three previous
convictions ‘for robbery or burglary,’ was to receive a mandatory
minimum sentence of imprisonment for 15 years.”29 In 1986, the
ACCA was “recodified as 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),”30 and several months
later the scope of the provision was expanded beyond robbery and
burglary.31 The current language of the statute imposes a “15-year
mandatory prison term on an individual convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm if that individual has ‘three previous
convictions . . . for a violent felony.’”32
The statutory definition for “violent felony” is functionally
identical to the Commission’s definition of “crime of violence” given
above;33 consequently, courts have treated the interpretation of one
as functionally the interpretation of the other.34 For purposes of this
27. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) (emphasis added).
28. Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 18, 98 Stat. 2185, (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app.
§ 1202(a) (1982 ed., Supp. III)), repealed by Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
99-308, § 104(b), 100 Stat. 459 (1986).
29. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990) (quoting ACCA § 1202(a)).
30. Id. at 582.
31. Id.
32. Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 689 (2009) (second emphasis added)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006)).
33. Montgomery, supra note 12, at 718 (“Obviously, the Sentencing Guidelines’
definition of a crime of violence is nearly identical to the ACCA’s definition of a violent
felony.”). Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2006) (“The term
‘crime of violence’ means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year, that . . . (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling,
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (“[T]he
term ‘violent felony’ means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year . . . that . . . (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another . . . .”).
34. Montgomery, supra note 12, at 718 (“Not surprisingly, courts have interpreted
crime of violence and violent felony as interchangeable terms; the case law applies to both.
Opinions interpreting the ACCA’s violent felony are regularly used to construe the Sentencing
Guidelines’ crime of violence and vice versa.”); see, e.g., United States v. Rivers, 595 F.3d 558,
560 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010); see also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 206 (2007) (noting
the similar definitions between “crime of violence” and “violent felony”).
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Note, it will be assumed that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
interpreting the term “violent felony” in the context of the ACCA
will apply to the interpretation of the Commission’s term “crime of
violence.” Furthermore, since the terms “crime of violence” and
“violent felony” are functionally interchangeable, this Note will
predominantly use “crime of violence” to refer to both terms.
B. The Categorical Approach to the Enumerated Crimes
In 1990, the Supreme Court examined the ACCA for the
purpose of interpreting the definition of burglary,35 which along with
arson, extortion, and “use of explosives” constitute the enumerated
crimes that explicitly qualify as sentence-enhancing “crimes of
violence.” In the case, Taylor v. United States, Arthur Lajuane Taylor
argued that his prior convictions for burglary should not enhance his
sentence because “Congress meant to include as predicate offenses
only a subclass of burglaries whose elements include ‘conduct that
presents a serious risk of physical injury to another,’ over and above
the risk inherent in ordinary burglaries.”36
The Court disagreed, finding that “[t]here never was any
proposal to limit the predicate offense to some special subclass of
burglaries that might be especially dangerous.”37 Instead, under a socalled “categorical approach,” courts are required to look to the
statute, and not to the specific facts of the offense, to determine
whether an offense categorically presents a “serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.”38
C. The Problematic Residual Clause
While Taylor provided a somewhat workable test for the four
enumerated crimes, it did little to interpret the reference in the
residual clause to a “crime of violence.” The residual clause includes
crimes, other than the four enumerated offenses, that “otherwise
involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical

35. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 577 (1990).
36. Id. at 597.
37. Id. at 588.
38. See id. at 600 (“The Courts of Appeals uniformly have held that § 924(e) mandates
a formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses,
and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions. We find the reasoning of these
cases persuasive.” (citations omitted)).
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injury to another.”39 The Taylor categorical test is much more
difficult without an established generic definition of an offense
because different judges are likely to formulate different generic
definitions, resulting in circuit splits.40 Given this uncertainty, the
Supreme Court has made several attempts, with mixed results, to
guide lower courts on how to interpret the residual clause.
1. The James v. United States approach
The issue before the Court in James was whether attempted
burglary, although not one of the four enumerated offenses, would
qualify as a “crime of violence” under the residual clause.41 The
Court ultimately held that attempted burglary and other attempt
crimes that present a “serious potential risk of physical injury to
another” are covered by the residual clause.42
While this five-to-four decision was clear on the result, the
majority’s interpretation of the relationship between the residual
clause and the enumerated crimes was confusing at best. The
majority seemed unsure whether the enumerated crimes were merely
examples of “crimes of violence” or whether they provided a baseline
against which to measure the degree of risk of the non-enumerated
crimes.43

39. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4B1.2(a)(2) (2006).
40. See Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 694 & n.2 (2009) (Alito, J.,
concurring in judgment). In Chambers, Justice Alito recognized circuit splits over whether the
following crimes fell within the residual clause: rape, conspiracy to commit burglary, carrying a
concealed weapon, possessing a sawed-off shotgun as a felon, unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle, and automobile tampering. Id. (citations omitted).
41. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007).
42. Id. at 195, 198.
43. First, the Court explained that completed burglaries are a “baseline against which to
measure the degree of risk that a non-enumerated offense must ‘otherwise’ present in order to
qualify.” Id. at 208. Then a page later the majority stated, “Nothing in the language of
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) rules out the possibility that an offense may present ‘a serious risk of
physical injury to another’ without presenting as great a risk as any of the enumerated
offenses.” Id. at 209. Instead, “As long as an offense is of a type that, by its nature, presents a
serious potential risk of injury to another, it satisfies the requirements of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s
residual provision.” Id.
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2. The Begay v. United States revision
Shortly after James, the Court clarified the relationship between
the residual clause and the enumerated offenses. The issue before the
Court in Begay was whether a felony conviction for driving under the
influence of alcohol (“DUI”) could qualify as a “crime of
violence.”44 The majority reversed the Tenth Circuit,45 and held that
the residual clause only covers crimes that are “roughly similar, in
kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the [enumerated]
examples.”46 The majority explained that the enumerated crimes all
“typically involve purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct,”47
whereas DUI is typically a strict liability offense.48 In other words, in
order for an offense to fall within the residual clause, it has to be an
offense that typically involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive
conduct. The Court reasoned that prior crimes with these
characteristics “reveal a degree of callousness toward risk . . . [and]
also show an increased likelihood that the offender is the kind of
person who might deliberately point the gun and pull the trigger.”49
Furthermore, without this understanding, the Court feared that a
harsh sentence enhancement “would apply to a host of crimes which,
though dangerous, are not typically committed by those whom one
normally labels ‘armed career criminals.’”50
3. The Chambers v. United States continuation
About a year later, in Chambers the Court held that a conviction
for failure to report to prison did not fall under the residual clause.51
Even though the charging statute nominally included the failure-toreport offense as a species of escape, the Court considered failure to
report as a separate crime.52 Looking just at the failure-to-report
offense, the Court observed, “the crime amounts to a form of
inaction, a far cry from the ‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

56

Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 139 (2008).
United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 2006).
Begay, 553 U.S. at 143.
Id. at 144–45.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 689 (2009).
Id. at 691.
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conduct’ potentially at issue” during the commission of one of the
enumerated offenses.53 Thus, the Court not only continued the
Begay doctrine, it appeared to reinforce its concern that lower courts
have been interpreting the residual clause too liberally.
D. The Tenth Circuit’s Approach to Utah’s Failure-to-Stop Statute
After Begay, but before Chambers, the Tenth Circuit held in
United States v. West that a conviction under Utah’s failure-to-stop
statute fell within the ambit of the residual clause.54 The court
considered failure to stop as analogous to escape, which made its
analysis relatively easy since previous Tenth Circuit precedent
recognized that escape categorically “constitutes conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another . . . .”55
However, the court recognized that the Supreme Court might
overrule the Tenth Circuit’s categorical approach to escape,56 a
prediction that ultimately proved correct.57 Perhaps given this
recognition, the West panel alternatively held that the failure-to-stop
offense satisfied the new “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test.58
First, in finding that the statute required purposeful conduct, the
court reasoned that “[d]isregarding a signal after receiving it will, in
the ordinary case, be knowing and deliberate or intentional.”59
Second, the court found that “[t]here is little doubt that knowingly
flaunting the order of a police officer is aggressive conduct.”60 Third,
the court determined that failure to stop is akin to burglary in that
there is a potential for a violent confrontation, therefore satisfying
the “violent” prong of the Begay test.61

53. Id. at 692 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. United States v. West, 550 F.3d 952, 960 (10th Cir. 2008).
55. Id. at 963 (quoting United States v. Springfield, 196 F.3d 1180, 1185 (10th Cir.
1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
56. Id. at 963 n.9.
57. See Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 691; United States v. Shipp, 589 F.3d 1084, 1090 n.3
(10th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that Chambers overruled the Tenth Circuit’s “prior precedent
characterizing escape as a per se ‘violent felony’ under the ACCA” (citation omitted)).
58. West, 550 F.3d at 968–71.
59. Id. at 971 (citation omitted).
60. Id. at 969.
61. Id. at 969–70 (“It is likely to lead, in the ordinary case, to a chase or at least an
effort by police to apprehend the perpetrator. All of these circumstances increase the likelihood
of serious harm to the officers involved as well as any bystanders that by happenstance get in
the way of a fleeing perpetrator or his pursuers.”).
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IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
More than a year after West, and in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Chambers, the Tenth Circuit again reviewed the
issue of whether Utah’s failure-to-stop offense could qualify as a
predicate offense under the “crime of violence” residual clause.62 In
United States v. Wise, Michael Charles Wise argued that Chambers
undermined the precedential force of West because Chambers
concluded that not all escape crimes are crimes of violence.63 The
Tenth Circuit disagreed; instead, it determined that “[t]he
distinction upon which the Supreme Court in Chambers ultimately
based its decision is the distinction between crimes of inaction, such
as a passive failure to report, and crimes requiring action, such as an
escape from custody.”64 Furthermore, the court reasoned, “it is clear
that in West, the kinds of escape crimes we were talking about and
drawing support from were the active, violent escape crimes not at
issue in Chambers.”65
The court distinguished the Utah failure-to-stop offense from
the failure-to-report offense at issue in Chambers. First, the court
concluded that the failure-to-stop offense requires “deliberate
action,” which the court described as “a far cry from a mere failure
to appear at a prison.”66 Second, it observed that the failure-to-stop
offense would always occur in the presence of police officers, while
“a failure to report to a penal institution will inherently not involve
the physical presence of police officers.”67 Third, the Utah offense “is
far more likely to endanger third parties,” while the failure-to-report
offense might not involve anyone else at all.68 Finally, while the
Supreme Court did not see failure to report as posing a serious
potential risk of harm, the Tenth Circuit saw the violation of Utah’s
failure-to-stop statute as creating a risk of a confrontation.69
62. United States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141, 1142 (10th Cir. 2010).
63. Id. at 1145.
64. Id. at 1146.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1146–47.
69. Id. at 1147 (“[T]he requirement that a violation of the Utah statute occur in the
presence of a police officer ‘poses the threat of a direct confrontation between the police officer
and the occupants of the vehicle, which, in turn, creates a potential for serious physical injury
to the officer, other occupants of the vehicle, and even bystanders.’” (quoting United States v.
West, 550 F.3d 952, 964–65 (10th Cir. 2008))).

58

DO NOT DELETE

4/5/2011 7:44 PM

49

United States v. Wise
V. ANALYSIS

This Note argues that the Tenth Circuit in Wise was probably
correct in stating that West was not directly overruled; however, this
assertion was correct only because the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence has been so vague and ambiguous. Moreover, even if
West is still controlling precedent, it is fundamentally inconsistent
with the tenor and reasoning of Begay and Chambers. This Note
argues that the trend of the Court has been to shrink the
applicability of the “crime of violence” residual clause, and that it is
probably only a matter of time before the Court forecloses all but the
most violent and aggressive failure-to-stop offenses from the residual
clause altogether. Furthermore, this Note considers several
approaches the Court might take in reviewing this issue, including
adopting a proposal by Judge Posner as well as the ultimate
possibility of striking the “crime of violence” residual clause on
account of unconstitutional vagueness.
A. Did West Survive Chambers?
Chambers almost certainly did not directly overrule West. In
Chambers, the Supreme Court decided to review failure-to-report
offenses separately from escape offenses, even though the Illinois
statute lumped them together, treating failure to report as a form of
escape.70 The Court ultimately held that failure to report was “a form
of inaction, a far cry from the ‘purposeful, “violent,” and
“aggressive” conduct’ potentially at issue” when an enumerated
offense is committed.71 Furthermore, the Court said that “[t]he
behavior that likely underlies a failure to report would seem less
likely to involve a risk of physical harm than the less passive, more
aggressive behavior underlying an escape from custody.”72 In other
words, the Court held that a more passive and inactive form of
escape—i.e., failure to report to prison—could not satisfy the Begay
test.

70. Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 691 (2009).
71. Id. at 692.
72. Id. at 691.
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However, the Court did implicitly overrule the Tenth Circuit’s
precedent that all escape offenses, whether active or inactive,
categorically “constitute[] conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another.”73 Consequently, some lower
courts have agreed with the Tenth Circuit that Chambers only dealt
with inactive escapes, leaving active escape offenses untouched, and
thus still within the residual clause.74 Under this approach, the
failure-to-stop offense is a species of active escape that was unaffected
by Chambers.75 However, other courts have been more skeptical,
arguing that Chambers cannot be so easily distinguished.76
Ultimately, without further guidance from the Supreme Court, the
Tenth Circuit may plausibly assert that West was not directly
overruled, and thus still remains the law of the Tenth Circuit.
B. The Shrinking Breadth of the Residual Clause
Even though West, and consequently Wise, nominally remain
good law in the Tenth Circuit for now, it is important to realize that
the recent trend of the Supreme Court has been to narrow the scope
of the residual clause.
1. James—2007
When the Court initially reviewed the residual clause in James,
the majority gave it a fairly generous reading—interpreting it to
include essentially any crime that happened to present a “serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.”77 There seemed to be no
73. West, 550 F.3d at 963 (quoting United States v. Springfield, 196 F.3d 1180, 1185
(10th Cir. 1999)); see also id. (“[E]very escape scenario is a powder keg, which may or may not
explode into violence and result in physical injury to someone at any given time, but which
always has the serious potential to do so.” (quoting United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140,
1142 (10th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
74. See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 423–24 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“Numerous courts have reaffirmed, however, that an escape from secure custody is not
analogous to failure to report and, therefore, is not covered by Chambers.”).
75. Id. at 424 (“Chambers . . . explicitly distinguished failure to report from escape from
confinement. Vehicular fleeing, the offense at issue here, is much more similar to the latter.
While failure to report is a passive crime characterized by inaction, vehicular fleeing necessarily
involves affirmative action on the part of the perpetrator.” (citations omitted)).
76. See, e.g., id. at 434 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“[T]he point of Chambers was that we
can’t treat all escapes alike.”); United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1294 (11th Cir.
2009) (“Chambers rejects the notion that all escapes are created equal. And, likewise, we reject
the notion that all willful fleeing crimes should be treated equally . . . .”).
77. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 209 (2007).
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limitation that the non-enumerated crimes have any similarity to the
four enumerated crimes in the “crime of violence” definition.
Instead, it seemed that the enumerated crimes were merely examples
of crimes that had a certain degree of risk.78 The Court, however,
was unclear on this point.79
The dissent, voiced by Justice Scalia, correctly criticized the
majority’s approach as failing to provide any “guidance concrete
enough to ensure that the ACCA residual provision will be applied
with an acceptable degree of consistency by the hundreds of district
judges that impose sentences every day.”80 Consequently, lower
court judges have been left “to their own devices in deciding, crimeby-crime, which conviction ‘involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.’”81
2. Begay—2008
Apparently unsatisfied with the James approach to the residual
clause, the Court decided Begay less than a year later. Whereas the
majority in James and the Tenth Circuit in the then-captioned
United States v. Begay had interpreted the residual clause according
to its broadest reading,82 the Supreme Court in Begay significantly
limited its scope. Instead of seeing the enumerated examples as four
random crimes that merely illustrate a certain degree of risk, the
Court correctly held that the enumerated crimes were also the kinds
of crime that Congress wanted to address.83 Under this approach,
the residual clause only covers crimes that are “roughly similar, in
kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the [enumerated] examples
themselves.”84

78. Id. at 198–200.
79. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
80. James, 550 U.S. at 215 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 216.
82. See United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 973 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Thus, both the
natural meaning of the statutory language and the apparent statutory purpose support a
construction of the term violent felony to include felony DWI. Neither the legislative history
nor canons of construction persuade otherwise.”), rev’d, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
83. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142–43 (2008).
84. Id. at 143.
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While it is significant that the Court explicitly held that the
residual clause “covers only similar crimes, rather than every crime
that ‘presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,’”85
the Court narrowed the residual clause even more by how it defined
the commonality of the enumerated crimes. The majority explained
that the enumerated crimes all “typically involve purposeful,
‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct.”86 With the word “purposeful,”
the Court immediately removed all negligent and reckless crimes,
even though many of these crimes would typically present a “serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.”87 With the words
“violent” and “aggressive,” the Court underscored that the residual
clause only covers prior crimes that are typically committed by the
hardened criminal who would be more likely to “deliberately point
[a] gun and pull the trigger.”88
With the Court’s new “purposeful, violent, and aggressive”
definition, it sent a clear message to the lower courts that the “crime
of violence” sentencing enhancement should be reserved for very
serious crimes that are typically committed by hardened criminals.
Otherwise, the Court feared that a harsh enhancement “would apply
to a host of crimes which, though dangerous, are not typically
committed by those whom one normally labels ‘armed career
criminals.’”89
3. Chambers—2009
About a year later, the Court narrowed the residual clause a bit
more in Chambers when the Court held that a conviction for failureto-report to prison did not fall under the residual clause.90 By doing
this, the Court showed that it was willing to not only buck a clear
circuit majority,91 but also slice and dice a state statute to determine
whether the underlying crime actually constituted “purposeful,

85. Id. at 142 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006)).
86. Id. at 144–45 (quoting Begay, 470 F.3d at 980 (McConnell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
87. See id. at 152 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
88. Id. at 146 (majority opinion).
89. Id.
90. Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 689 (2009).
91. See United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting almost
unanimous agreement by other courts of appeals), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009).
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violent, and aggressive” conduct.92 Merely labeling an offense as a
form of escape was not sufficient for it to qualify for the residual
clause.93
C. The Likely Fate of Failure-to-Stop Statutes
The Court’s distinct skepticism about the reach of the residual
clause might lead to excluding all but the most legitimately
dangerous failure-to-stop offenses. Although various states have
failure-to-stop statutes, they disagree over the necessary elements of
the crime. Some states require other laws to be broken in the course
of fleeing,94 while others, like Utah, require almost nothing more
than a mere failure to stop for the police.95 Likewise, some circuit
courts have held that a failure-to-stop offense must include elements
of high speed and recklessness to fall within the residual clause.96
Other courts, like the Tenth Circuit, have held that such elements
are not required because any flight from the police might involve
high speed and recklessness.97
The problem with the Tenth Circuit’s position is that, while the
Court’s jurisprudence has been “almost entirely ad hoc,”98
gimmicky,99 and “piecemeal,”100 the Tenth Circuit has disregarded
the Court’s clear message that it is unhappy with lower courts
broadly applying the residual clause to crimes that are not typically
92. See Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 691.
93. See id.; cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588–89 (1990) (“Congress
intended that the enhancement provision be triggered by crimes having certain specified
elements, not by crimes that happened to be labeled ‘robbery’ or ‘burglary’ by the laws of the
State of conviction.”).
94. See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 417 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing 625
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-204.1 (Supp. 2010)).
95. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-210(1)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2010).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A]
disobedient driver’s failure to accelerate to a high rate of speed or to drive recklessly signals a
different type of criminal and suggests an unwillingness to engage in violent conduct.”);
United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722, 725 (8th Cir. 2009).
97. See United States v. West, 550 F.3d 952, 964 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[U]nder the stress
and urgency which will naturally attend his situation, a person fleeing from law enforcement
will likely drive recklessly and turn any pursuit into a high-speed chase with the potential for
serious harm to police or innocent bystanders.” (quoting United States v. Kendrick, 423 F.3d
803, 809 (8th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
98. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 215 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 150 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment).
100. Id.
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violent and aggressive. Instead of heeding this message, the Tenth
Circuit is willing to engage in a flight of fancy—imagining that
almost any failure to stop for the police is tantamount to a violent
and aggressive confrontation with the police that may result in a
dangerous high speed chase,101 no matter how improbable. In other
words, the Tenth Circuit rationalizes its decision on little more than
sheer speculation about what any criminal might do, rather than
what a hardened criminal typically does.
However, even if the Tenth Circuit position contradicts the spirit
of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the Court will eventually need
to step in and clarify its position. As mentioned above, the Court will
have an opportunity this term to decide whether failure-to-stop
offenses fall within the “crime of violence” residual clause.102 If the
Court’s past decisions are any indication of its intentions, it will most
likely narrow the scope of the residual clause even more, possibly by
limiting the residual clause to only the most legitimately dangerous
failure-to-stop offenses. However, it remains to be seen whether the
Court will simply resolve this particular circuit split, or whether it
will take any more drastic measures to deal with the residual clause in
general.
Unless the Court is ready to strike down the “crime of violence”
residual clause as unconstitutionally vague,103 it will need to hone its
jurisprudence to further constrain the circuit courts. If the Court
chooses this second path, this Note recommends that the Court
consider Judge Richard Posner’s proposal that the Court redefine its
test so that “purposeful” (as in Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and
aggressive”) would mean, “trying to harm a person’s person or
property.”104 As discussed above, the Court in Begay explained that
the residual clause covers only crimes that are similar in kind and
type to the four enumerated crimes—burglary, arson, extortion, and
use of explosives.105 Judge Posner aptly recognized that these are
essentially crimes that require proof of intent to harm property

101. See West, 550 F.3d at 964–65.
102. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
103. See James, 550 U.S. at 230 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Congress has simply abdicated
its responsibility when it passes a criminal statute insusceptible of an interpretation that enables
principled, predictable application; and this Court has abdicated its responsibility when it
allows that.”).
104. Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 434 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting).
105. See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.
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interests, and which only incidentally may involve harm to persons.106
Consequently, under this approach, the crimes that fall under the
residual clause should not permit a lesser standard of proof—i.e., just
a bare risk of harm to persons—without any underlying intent to
actually harm persons or property interests. This revision would likely
prevent lower court judges from speculating whether a particular
offense, like failure to stop for the police, might result in harm
because judges would be required to see whether the underlying
criminal statute expressly required proof of intent to harm persons or
property.
However, while this Note believes that Judge Posner’s revision
would help narrow the “crime of violence” residual clause, this
approach may not ultimately prevent the seemingly perpetual circuit
splits concerning the offenses that fall under the residual clause.107
Obviously, it would help if Congress redrafted the statute to
eliminate the ambiguities.108 Failing that, the Court could force
Congress’s hand by striking the statute as unconstitutionally
vague.109 Since the Court may not be ready to do that, it probably
will just adopt narrowing revisions on a case-by-case basis. However,
this case-by-case approach seems to confirm Justice Scalia’s
prediction that it “will take decades, and dozens of grants of
certiorari, to allocate all the Nation’s crimes to one or the other side
of this entirely reasonable and entirely indeterminate line.”110
VI. CONCLUSION
Thus, under current precedent, the Tenth Circuit is nominally
correct to hold that a conviction under Utah’s failure-to-stop statute
constituted a “crime of violence.” However, this conflicts with the
Supreme Court’s unequivocal message to the lower courts that the
“crime of violence” residual clause should be narrowly construed.
Given the Court’s past treatment of the residual clause, it will most
likely choose to narrow it further, constraining the residual clause to
106. See Welch, 604 F.3d at 434.
107. See Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 694 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment).
108. Id. at 695 (“At this point, the only tenable, long-term solution is for Congress to
formulate a specific list of expressly defined crimes that are deemed to be worthy of ACCA’s
sentencing enhancement.”).
109. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 230 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 216.
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cover only the most legitimately dangerous failure-to-stop offenses.
This Note suggests that the Court adopt Judge Posner’s proposed
revision to help narrow the residual clause. Ultimately, though, this
Note recognizes that the Court’s case-by-case approach to dealing
with the residual clause is futile in preventing perpetual circuit splits,
and that the Court should seriously consider striking the residual
clause entirely because of its unconstitutional vagueness.
Edan Burkett
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